I have been reading Thomas Rick's book, Fiasco, about the er... fiasco that was the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
One of Rick's main criticisms is that there was no proper plan for what to do in Iraq after the initial military invasion.
Ricks says something very perceptive - that tactics flow from strategy. I think Bobby Fischer (?) once said something similar.
Here's what Ricks says about Tommy Franks, the general in overall charge of planning, who thought in terms of narrow tactics but not in larger-scale strategical terms.
//On April 7 [2003], the second foray cut through to Saddam’s palace complex in the center of Baghdad, on the left bank of the Tigris, and decided to stay. The American military believed it had taken Baghdad.
Franks flunks strategy
To understand that mistaken conclusion, it is necessary to step back and examine Gen. Tommy Franks, the senior U.S. commander in the war, and particularly his misunderstanding of strategy. That is a grand-sounding word, and it is frequently misused by laymen as a synonym for tactics.
In fact, strategy has a very different and quite simple meaning that flows from just one short set of questions: Who are we, and what are we ultimately trying to do here? How will we do it, and what resources and means will we employ in doing it? The four answers give rise to one’s strategy.
Ideally, one’s tactics will then follow from them—that is, this is who we are, this is the outcome we wish to achieve, this is how we aim to do it, and this is what we will use to do it.
But addressing the questions well can be surprisingly difficult, and if the answers are incorrect or incomplete, or the goals listed not reachable, then the consequences can be disastrous.
Why would the United States invade Iraq without a genuine strategy in hand? Part of the answer lies in the personality and character of Gen. Franks. The inside word in the U.S. military long had been that Franks didn’t think strategically.
For example, when the general held an off-the-record session with officers studying at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, in the spring of 2002, not long after the biggest battle of the Afghan war, Operation Anaconda, one student posed the classic Clausewitzian question: What is the nature of the war you are fighting in Afghanistan?
“That’s a great question for historians,” Franks sidestepped, recalled another officer who was there. “Let me tell you what we are doing.”
Franks proceeded to discuss how U.S. troops cleared cave complexes in Afghanistan. It was the most tactical answer possible, quite remote from what the officer had asked. It would have been a fine reply for a sergeant to offer, but not a senior general. “He really was comfortable at the tactical level,” this officer recalled with dismay.//
Interesting questions but rehashing wars is a subject worth discussing in your book club, not here in the forum.
Some people here probably suffered personal loss in the conflicts-- on both sides.
I have been reading Thomas Rick's book, Fiasco, about the er... fiasco that was the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
One of Rick's main criticisms is that there was no proper plan for what to do in Iraq after the initial military invasion.
Ricks says something very perceptive - that tactics flow from strategy. I think Bobby Fischer (?) once said something similar.
Here's what Ricks says about Tommy Franks, the general in overall charge of planning, who thought in terms of narrow tactics but not in larger-scale strategical terms.
//On April 7 [2003], the second foray cut through to Saddam’s palace complex in the center of Baghdad, on the left bank of the Tigris, and decided to stay. The American military believed it had taken Baghdad.
Franks flunks strategy
To understand that mistaken conclusion, it is necessary to step back and examine Gen. Tommy Franks, the senior U.S. commander in the war, and particularly his misunderstanding of strategy. That is a grand-sounding word, and it is frequently misused by laymen as a synonym for tactics.
In fact, strategy has a very different and quite simple meaning that flows from just one short set of questions: Who are we, and what are we ultimately trying to do here? How will we do it, and what resources and means will we employ in doing it? The four answers give rise to one’s strategy.
Ideally, one’s tactics will then follow from them—that is, this is who we are, this is the outcome we wish to achieve, this is how we aim to do it, and this is what we will use to do it.
But addressing the questions well can be surprisingly difficult, and if the answers are incorrect or incomplete, or the goals listed not reachable, then the consequences can be disastrous.
Why would the United States invade Iraq without a genuine strategy in hand? Part of the answer lies in the personality and character of Gen. Franks. The inside word in the U.S. military long had been that Franks didn’t think strategically.
For example, when the general held an off-the-record session with officers studying at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, in the spring of 2002, not long after the biggest battle of the Afghan war, Operation Anaconda, one student posed the classic Clausewitzian question: What is the nature of the war you are fighting in Afghanistan?
“That’s a great question for historians,” Franks sidestepped, recalled another officer who was there. “Let me tell you what we are doing.”
Franks proceeded to discuss how U.S. troops cleared cave complexes in Afghanistan. It was the most tactical answer possible, quite remote from what the officer had asked. It would have been a fine reply for a sergeant to offer, but not a senior general. “He really was comfortable at the tactical level,” this officer recalled with dismay.//