Some other cool Napoleon & Chess related links:
This is Edward Winter's essay "Napoleon Bonaparte and Chess"
http://www.chesshistory.com/winter/extra/napoleon.html
And you can watch 4 of Napoleon's games here at chessbase, including one wherein he battles the Turk:
http://www.chessgames.com/perl/chessplayer?pid=77025
“The art of war is an immense study, which comprises all others.”
- Napoleon Bonaparte
I found this downright eerie: last night, thinking that I might actually take my mind off of chess for one evening, I grabbed a random book from my bookshelf – one of the old hardcover academic books bequeathed to me by an English professor, laid down with it and flipped randomly into it. The book I’d chosen was “The Age of Napoleon” by Will and Ariel Durant. After reading a little while, I came upon a section entitled “Napoleon Himself”, part IV of which described what he was like as a general – and his ideas about strategy in war.
Now this was astounding – at a few pivitol moments, if I’d been reading the sentences out of context, I would’ve sworn it was chess being discussed. I’m going to quote two long paragraphs in full below – particular sentences are unreally applicable. I guess chess really does simulate war after all. And I guess, even as I try and take a night off, it finds me nevertheless. Enjoy!
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From The Age of Napoleon (pages 248)
Napoleon expressed part of his strategy in a mathematical formula: “The strength of an army, like the amount of momentum in mechanics, is estimated by mass times the velocity. A swift march enhances the morale of an army, increases it’s power for victory.” There is no authority for ascribing to him the aphorism that “an army travels with its stomach” – that is, on its food supply; his view was rather that it wins with its feet. His motto was “Activité, activité, vitesse” – action and speed. Consequently he placed no reliance on fortresses as defenses; he would’ve laughed at the Maginot Line of 1939. “It is axiomatic,” he had said, far back in 1793, “that the side which remains behind its fortified line is always defeated”; and he repeated this in 1816. To watch for the time when the enemy divides or elongates his army; to use mountains and rivers to screen and protect the movement of his troops; to seize strategical elevations from which artillery could rake the field; to choose a battleground that would allow the maneuvers of infantry, artillery, and cavalry; to concentrate one’s forces – usually by swift marches – so as to confront with superior numbers a segment of the enemy too far from the center to be reinforced in time: these were the elements of Napoleonic strategy.
The final test of the general is in tactics – the disposition and maneuvering of his forces for and during battle. Napoleon tooks his stand where he could survey much of the action as his safety would allow; and since the plan of operations, and it’s quick adjustment to the turn of events, depended on his continued and concentrated attention, his safety was a prime consideration, even more in the judgement of his troops than in his actual practice; if he thought it necessary, as at Arcole, he did not hesitate to expose himself; and more than once we read of men being killed at his side in his place of observation …
In battle, he believed, soldiers acquired their value chiefly through their position and maneuverability. Here too the aim was concentration – of massed men and heavy fire on a particular point, preferably a flank, of the enemy, in the hope of throwing that part into a disorder that would spread. “In all battles a moment comes when the bravest troops, after having made the greatest efforts, feel inclined to run… Two armies are two bodies that meet and endeavor to frighten each other; a moment of panic occurs, and that moment must be turned to advantage. When a man has been present in many actions, he distinguishes that moment without difficulty.”
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…!!!!!! Cool, eh? Lot's to talk about in there.