Is Morality Objective or Subjective?

Our Moral Canvas

What exactly is morality? Are some actions morally wrong as a matter of fact, or are moral appraisals a matter of opinion? These are the types of questions that humanity has wrestled with throughout history, and there is still no consensus. Despite the ongoing debate, when we separate ourselves from our emotions and biases, there is but one logical conclusion. Morality is subjective. While moral appraisals can have objective measures to achieve a desired goal, morality itself necessarily must begin with a subjective basis.

The philosophy of ethics, also known as moral philosophy, is a branch of philosophy that covers a wide range of topics dealing with morality, and it is broken down into three main categories. Metaethics seeks to ascertain the very nature of morality. Normative ethics discusses methods for distinguishing right from wrong behaviors. Applied ethics deals the application of morality to our decision-making process. Philosophers continue to disagree about whether morality is objective or subjective, referred to as moral realism and moral anti-realism, respectively. In a 2009 PhilPapers survey, 56.4% of philosophers believe in moral realism, 27.7% moral anti-realism, and 15.9% other.

Morality is a formal or informal system by which we assign value judgments on behaviors. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes morality as, “certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion) or accepted by an individual for her own behavior.” When appraising behaviors, the words, moral and immoral are descriptors we use for behaviors we deem to be good or bad. We sometimes use adjectives in place of good or bad that are specific to a subject; for example, the word delicious. Delicious food is understood to mean food that tastes good. Just as “delicious” is specific to food, “moral” is specific to behavior, and in both cases, they mean good.

Adjectives that describe objective traits all have fact-based criteria to justify the adjective. A bald man is a man with no hair. A ferrous metal is a metal that contains iron. Adjectives that describe subjective traits rely on personal feelings and preferences, e.g. beautiful, glorious, and remarkable. When we attempt to justify the adjectives, moral and immoral with an objective criterion, we ultimately fail because we inevitably end up defining them with yet, another subjective adjective: “a moral action is an action that is good.”

Morality can also be described as system of distinguishing right from wrong behaviors. Can propositions be objectively right or objectively wrong? Sometimes they can, but it depends on the context. A mathematical equation can be objectively right, while other propositions are dependent on a subjective goal, meaning a personal preference. When choosing a college or university to attend, or a job offer to accept, or a vehicle to purchase, there are no objectively right or wrong choices that are independent from your wants or needs. If you are choosing a car to purchase and your goal is to buy car that has climate control, four doors, and achieves an average fuel economy of greater than 25 mpg, you now have objective measures by which to compare options. But sans your personal preferences, there are no objective measures.

This is the reality of our moral decisions. We have specific goals we are working to achieve, irrespective of whether we are conscious of them. Some common behavioral goals are furthering well-being and preventing harm, conformity to religious beliefs, conformity to local laws, conformity to social etiquette, and conformity to cultural norms. As humans our moral compass often points in the same direction with respect to an action, but sometimes it does not.

When those differences arise, there are two possible causes. The first cause is a difference of opinion of the predicted outcome of an action; for example, one person may think it is immoral not to wear a mask in public to mitigate the spread of COVID-19, while another person disagrees. Both people may use well-being as a basis for their morality, but they disagree about the effectiveness of wearing masks. In this case, one person convincing the other of their moral position is a matter of convincing them about the effectiveness of wearing masks. The second cause is foundational. A devoutly religious person may rely solely on their religious beliefs as the basis for their morality or prioritize it above all other bases. A non-religious person may prioritize well-being and give no consideration to any religious doctrine. When the two disagree about the morality of an action, often their disagreement foundational. For one to convince the other, they can attempt to convince them to change their moral foundation, which is a daunting task. Alternatively, they can attempt to meet the other person on their own moral ground. The religious person can attempt to convince the non-religious person that action X enhances well-being, for example.

Often proponents of objective morality argue from incredulity (“it just IS!”). Dr. Eric Deitrich is a professor of philosophy at Binghamton University. In his 2017 Psychology Today editorial, Morality is Objective, explains that “every living animal with a nervous system can and does experience harm” and he goes on to argue, “The question now is ‘Why ought we to check (or mitigate) such harm’. The answer is because it is harm!  Harm is bad by definition.” Respectfully, Dr. Deitrich is masking circular reasoning with an erroneous definition of harm. To be harmed is to sustain some form of damage, which is often perceived as being bad, but that perception is still a personal value judgment. Dr. Deitrich is clearly drawing up well-being as a basis for his morality. Because human beings have a capacity to feel empathy, it a common thread that moves our moral compass. This thread spans across all societies and cultures to varying degrees, and with some differences. We tend to feel very passionately about the well-being of others, and societies make laws intended to improve well-being and prevent harm. These factors cause people to intuitively think about morality in terms of moral facts, as opposed to personal value judgments. But the popularity (or even universality) of an opinion does not make it objective.

            Moral arguments that posit God as an absolute, objective moral standard are known as divine command theory. In his article, God and Morality, author Christopher Akers argues:

If unbiased logic is employed, the conclusion is clear: without a divine lawgiver moral     choices and actions must be subjective and ultimately meaningless. It is terrifying to understand the full implication of the words of Ivan in The Brothers Karamazov, that “without God everything is permissible.”

I am not arguing for nor against theism. Instead, I submit that the question of whether God exists is independent from whether morality is objective or subjective. If you do not like the taste of liver and God declares, “liver tastes delicious,” do culinary tastes cease being subjective? If God commands that murder, rape, and torture are moral, do those actions become objectively moral? You could argue that God would never issue such commands because God is benevolent, and those actions are immoral. But at that point you are no longer accepting divine command theory. The premise is no longer that action-X is good because God says so. Instead, the premise has become: God says so because action-X is good. This necessarily requires a separate moral foundation, such as well-being. With or without a divine lawgiver, morality is subjective.

            Akers suggests that morality being subjective would render it meaningless, but he provides no justification for his assertion. Our actions, and the actions of others, can have a profound effect on our lives. We have developed cooperative, mutually beneficial societies. We are deeply passionate about how we feel people should behave. We can also feel passionately about music, art, or a favorite sports team. Conversely, there are countless objective facts we accept as true, but consider to be mundane or meaningless to our lives. Passionate feelings are not a hallmark of objective facts. Being an objective fact is not a prerequisite for something to have meaning. How others within our societies behave is meaningful to us, which is why all human societies have created laws so that everything is (factually) not permissible. As a thought experiment, just suppose there is no divine lawgiver. Try going to the DMV on a Friday afternoon, cutting in line, and see if anything is permissible.

Objective morality is not strictly a theistic concept. Atheist, Sam Harris is a neuroscientist, a philosopher, and the author of a book titled, The Moral Landscape. Dr. Harris approaches the topic from a scientific standpoint, and he summarizes his book as follows:  

Morality and values depend on the existence of conscious minds—and specifically on the fact that such minds can experience various forms of well-being and suffering in this universe. Conscious minds and their states are natural phenomena, of course, fully constrained by the laws of Nature (whatever these turn out to be in the end). Therefore, there must be right and wrong answers to questions of morality and values that potentially fall within the purview of science. On this view, some people and cultures will be right (to a greater or lesser degree), and some will be wrong, with respect to what they deem important in life.

Not only do I agree with Dr. Harris that things like well-being, health, and happiness can be explained and analyzed scientifically, I think it is a worthwhile endeavor. But there is no rationale to claim it is an objective fact that we ought to care about well-being, even if people overwhelmingly do. I am not the first put forth this criticism. Dr. Harris addresses critics who argue “there is no scientific basis to say that we should value well-being” (and similar arguments) by replacing “well-being” with “health.” He then continues:

Is there a Value Problem, with respect to health? Is it unscientific to value health and seek to maximize it within the context of medicine? No. Clearly there are scientific truths to be known about health—and we can fail to know them, to our great detriment. This is a fact.

It is not unscientific to value health, because personal values are not a question about science, even if personal values can be explained by science. There certainly are scientific truths to be known about health, but not whether we should care about health.

 Acknowledging that morality is subjective is not an attempt to trivialize it, nor does it. It is merely a philosophical question, an intellectual inquiry. When we peel back all the layers of any moral question, we unfailingly end up in the realm of the subjective – good, bad, should and ought. In order to achieve objective moral assessments about actions, we must first begin with a personal preference to use as a basis, whether it’s religious adherence, well-being, legality, tradition, other, or (most commonly) a mixture of moral fabrics we have woven together to form our moral canvas. It is on this canvas that we have painted our masterpiece, our perception of right and wrong, moral and immoral.

Philosophers sure like to talk a lot.

@USArmyParatrooper -
Is murder okay in some instances?

Who are you asking, hvenki?

I was hoping for some conversation on the subject, but it seems a response is slow in coming, and perhaps may never appear. 
I disagree with the author of this piece; hence my question (post #4). There are some things that are moral absolutes, and not just a matter of “taste”. Murder, for instance. Do I just prefer that you not murder me, or anyone else for that matter, because of some cultural conditioning I’ve experienced, or because of a very real innate sense of justice that all human beings have, that says the taking of innocent life is absolutely wrong, independent of our cultural upbringing? 
Let’s go from the theoretical to the practical. If I were to somehow show up on your doorstep with a machete in my hand and say your little sister walks out the door and I chop off her head and kill her, why will you and your parents and anyone that cared for your little sister believe that I’d done something wrong? Will you all be thinking, “Oh, I really wish he hadn’t done that”, as if your reaction were just a matter of taste?
I apologize for being so graphic, and sincerely hope that something like that has never and will never happen to you. I guess I believe real life has a way of moving us out of our ivory towers.

Heh here's the real question, if you show up to kill his sister, is it moral for him to lie shes not home or be honest and risk your intentions?

Also the base of our morality stems from our biological evolution as social beings. As ideas flow from matter and not the other way around. Human intelligence and high affinity for social behavior gives birth to morality which has expanded with the advent of civilization. Michael Tomasello has done a lot research on the social aspect of humans and it's strength and manifestations. While the original post is certainly interesting it's just goes on and on spewing philosophical concepts completely ignoring biology, psychology, neuroscience etc. We are not born with a sense of justice we are born with an instinct for collaboration. This in combination with interpersonal relations prevalent in society, the interests of different classes, historical and cultural backgrounds, and the environment in general creates a system we call morality. Which technically doesn't even exist.

‘You could argue that God would never issue such commands because God is benevolent, and those actions are immoral.” 

Yes, one could make this argument, but is based in the belief and conviction that a God is truly benevolent. Where would such belief and conviction originate? 

@ Dzindo07 -

You posit that morality is merely a social construct, the outcome of a biological instinct for collaboration, yes? 
Allow me a hypothetical ...

You and your girlfriend go off to explore the jungles of Borneo. (Not the wisest choice, I know, but hey, this is a hypothetical). Unfortunately, you are both captured by a tribe of cannibals who have never had contact with the outside world. All they know is their own culture. They tie you to a stake and proceed to kill your girlfriend, cook her and eat her before your eyes. Then they raype you (intentional mis-spelling) and send you back into the jungle without your clothing. Have they done anything morally wrong?

That's a little too graphic... For me yes, for them no. As it is a social construct it does differ between peoples that have such a wide gap of civilization level. I can't hold them accountable for the murder of a stranger anymore than I can sue them for emotional distress.

@TheHarbingerOfDoom -

So they have failed to fulfill “loving their neighbor as themselves” in that regard. And that would be the standard they should live up to, or else it could be said they were objectively morally wrong. Is that what I hear you saying?

Morality is subjective and depends on perspective.

Powered figures such as law or god, define the standards for morality.

@ Dzindo07 -

I apologize for being so graphic; I’m trying to forcefully get past the merely philosophical to the practical. Morality is practical after all. 
You stated that the cannibals actions were wrong for you, but not for them. I like the point that TheHarbingerOfDoom brought up. If the cannibals could be shown that they were treating outsiders differently than their own tribe, in fact harming outsiders, might they have a sense they were being unjust? What if a more powerful tribe seemed to show up out of nowhere and began to capture, kill and eat them? Will they feel wronged? Or is it that merely that ‘might makes right’? 

Primitive tribes don't act the same way with strangers and members of their own tribe. They could see you as a threat or simply coming to use their already scarce resources. They are fighting for survival and they don't like to share their resources with outsiders. Most of the time. And yes might makes right. For most of human history it has been perfectly acceptable for us to kill and enslave people simply if we could, to quote Thucydides "the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must".  Now the question isn't would they treat you as a member of their own tribe but would they treat you as any other outsider. Now for a spin on it. Would they consider your trespassing immoral?

@ Harbinger - I’m not asserting any such thing. Like you, I’m saying that if they were faced with the inconsistencies in their actions, they have the ability to make different choices. Different MORAL choices. If I’m asserting that they are inferior or deficient in any way, it’s MORALLY.